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Abstract
Legislators in many countries enact security breach notification regulation to address a lack of in-
formation security. The laws designate authorities to collect breach reports and advise firms. We
devise a principal–agent model to analyze the economic effect of mandatory security breach re-
porting to authorities. The model assumes that firms (agents) have few incentives to unilaterally re-
port breaches. To enforce the law, regulators (principals) can introduce security audits and sanction
noncompliance. However, audits cannot differentiate between concealment and nescience of the
agents. Even under optimistic assumptions regarding the effectiveness of mandatory security
breach reporting to authorities in reducing individual losses, our model predicts that it may be diffi-
cult to adjust the sanction level such that breach notification laws generate social benefit.
Motivation
Confidentiality, integrity, and availability are the canonical protec-
tion goals for information systems. Security breaches are violations
of at least one of these protection goals [1]. They may concern data
protection or security [2]. In the past years, the intensity of attacks
against information systems and the number of observed security
breaches has increased, causing high costs for firms [3].
Firms incur two types of costs due to security breaches: direct and
indirect. Direct costs are, e.g., the costs of cleaning systems from mal-
ware. Indirect costs include intangible costs, which materialize, for in-
stance, in reputation loss if security breaches are publicly announced.
Quantifying, in particular, the indirect costs of security breaches is
hard. One approach suggested by Cavusoglu et al. [4], among others,
is to analyze the impact of breach publications on the stock market
value of breached firms. Firms in their sample lost (on average) 2.1%
of their market value within the first 2 days after a breach announce-
ment. (Cavusoglu et al. [4] also find cross-sectional variations in indir-
ect costs of firms and explain them by firms’ size, type, and the year in
which the breach occurred.) The authors attribute this negative effect
to shareholders’ anticipation of losses of confidence and trust by cus-
tomers. They argue that when security breaches become public, the in-
direct costs of these breaches exceed their direct costs.
Security breaches do not only generate costs at firms which are
directly affected. Interdependence between information systems
allows breaches to propagate and negatively affect others [5]. In the
language of economics, a lack of firms’ information security causes
negative externalities in an economy. The presence of negative exter-
nalities justifies government intervention, for instance, in the form
of laws aiming at reducing the costs of insecurity to society [6, 7].
One specific approach is the introduction of security breach noti-
fication laws. Such laws differ in their design, as
1. they may oblige firms to report security breaches to affected indi-
viduals, via direct or mass communication (implemented in sev-
eral US states [8]), or
2. they may oblige firms to report security breaches to authorities
(implemented for firms of selected sectors in the EU [9]).
In essence, breach notification laws try to establish some trans-
parency on breaches such that firms or individuals are able to pro-
tect themselves from propagating attacks. Furthermore, they shall
incentivize effective investment in information security. But as
breach reporting and security investments are costly [10], the effect-
ivity of these laws in decreasing the costs to society has to be ana-
lyzed. We are aware of empirical work on the economic effects of
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obliging firms to report security breaches to individuals (e.g., [11,
12, 13, 14]), and also find a theoretical model which examines this
scenario [15]. Moreover, several scholars analyze the economic in-
centives for voluntary security information sharing between firms
(e.g., [16, 10, 17]). And two studies discuss the effects of security in-
formation sharing between firms and authorities [18, 19]. However,
we observe a lack of scientific investigations on the conditions under
which mandatory security breach reporting to authorities is effective
in reducing social cost. As a starting point to close this research gap,
we devise and analyze a principal–agent model which captures the
conflicting interests between regulators and breached firms.
This article is structured as follows: Section “Background and re-
search question” provides a qualitative introduction to the research
topic and motivates our research question. Section “Related work”
discusses relations to prior art. We describe our principal–agent
model and present solutions for social optima and Nash equilibria
in Section “Model.” The last section concludes with a discussion
and an outlook for future research.
Background and research question
Security breach notification laws are on the policy agenda around
the globe for over a decade. Section “Security breach notification
laws” introduces selected laws implemented or discussed in the USA
and EU along with inherent mechanisms that are expected to incen-
tivize firms’ compliance. In Section “Incentives of firms,” we discuss
how a particular mechanism can alter incentives of firms to reduce
breach related costs. Our research question proposed in Section
“Research question” concerns the effectiveness of laws that make
use of this mechanism.
Security breach notification laws
Table 1 summarizes key characteristics of selected breach notifica-
tion laws. All of these laws lead to additional expected cost for
breached firms. Firms can reduce these costs if they prevent breaches
a priori, and thereby evade breach reporting. From a review of legal
texts and official justifications we conclude that this is in fact an im-
portant objective of breach notification laws in the USA and EU be-
sides improving the rights of the individuals affected by a breach.
Situation in the USA
State and federal laws mandate firms to notify affected individuals
about breaches. The first implemented state breach notification law
was the California Civil Code Section §1798.29. It obliges private
and public firms conducting business in California to report privacy
breaches to affected individuals. Additionally, the law stipulates
breach reporting to authorities if more than 500 data records are af-
fected. The intention of this law is 2-fold: first, informing
individuals about breaches enables them to take mitigating actions
[15]; second, the law incentivizes firms to encrypt personal data, as
only breaches of unencrypted records have to be reported. From the
start, the Californian law led to a high number of privacy breach re-
ports [12]. Because of this success, other US states enacted similar
laws [8]. Besides these state laws, there are two prominent federal
breach notification laws. They are formalized in the “Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act” (HIPAA)—amended
by the “Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health Act” (HITECH)—and the “Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act”
(GLBA), respectively. The HIPAA mandates firms in the health care
sector to report breaches of health information to affected individ-
uals, the Department of Health & Human Services, and under some
circumstances the media. The GLBA differs from the HIPAA in that
it obliges firms in the financial sector to inform their primary federal
regulator on privacy breaches, and in some cases notify affected in-
dividuals. In summary, some state and federal breach notification
laws stipulate privacy breach reporting to individuals only, while
others additionally require firms to inform authorities. In order to
incentivize firms’ compliance, most of the laws provide for fines in
cases of violations.
The 114th Congress has introduced new federal legislation on se-
curity information sharing. The House of Representatives (H.R.)
proposed “H.R.1770 – Data Security and Breach Notification Act
of 2015,” which intends to replace the existing patchwork of state
laws. Furthermore, US President Barack Obama submitted an
“Executive Order 13691, Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity
Information Sharing” with the objective to improve security infor-
mation sharing within the private sector and between the private
sector and the government. The order shall pave the way for new le-
gislation on security information sharing, formalized in different
bills: the H.R. introduced “H.R.234 – Cyber Intelligence Sharing
and Protection Act,” and passed “H.R.1560 – Protecting Cyber
Networks Act” in the Congress; Senate submitted “S.456 – Cyber
Threat Sharing Act of 2015,” and passed “S.754 – Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act.” Most of this legislation limits firms’ li-
ability if they not only share security information with each other,
but also with an authority, e.g., the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS).
Situation in the EU
Union laws (i.e., regulations and directives) and national laws of EU
Member States mandate firms to report breaches. All Member
States have to transpose directives into national law. Union laws in
the form of regulations are directly binding. Enforced union laws
that mandate breach reporting predominantly affect the telecoms
sector. Most of them were introduced with the “Telecoms Package”
in 2009. A prominent example is Directive 2009/136/EC, amending
Table 1. Characteristics of selected US and EU breach notification laws
Region Law Obliged Report Address Objective Effect
USA State laws Firms controlling personal data P I or A&I IP&R C or F&C
USA HIPAA & HITECH Firms in the health care sector P A&I IP&R F&C
USA GLBA Firms in the financial sector P I or A&I IP&R F&C
EU Telecoms package Firms in the telecoms sector S or P A or A&I IP&D or IP&D&R F or F&C
EU Regulation 2016/679 Data controllers and processors P A or A&I IP&D or IP&D&R F or F&C
EU NIS Directivea Market operators S&P A IP&D or IP&D&R F or F&C
S, Security breaches; P, Privacy breaches; A, Authorities; I, Affected individuals; IP, Incentivize firms to take precautions; D, Dissemination of knowledge to
firms; R, Improve rights of affected individuals; F, Fines; C, Indirect costs.
aProposed, not yet enacted.
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Directive 2002/58/EC. It has the objective to protect the privacy of
users’ data handled by electronic communications service providers.
The directive obliges providers to report breach information to
authorities and, under specific circumstances, also notify affected in-
dividuals. All of the enforced union breach notification laws that we
reviewed require firms to report breaches to “Competent
Authorities” in the first instance, rather than affected individuals—
as it is common in US laws. The declared objective is to establish
union-wide transparency on breaches [9]: informed authorities can
disseminate conclusions drawn from breach information (subse-
quently referred to as “dissemination of knowledge”). For instance,
they can offer guidance to breached firms and individuals on how to
minimize impact, or inform non-breached firms and individuals on
how to protect against propagating attacks. In addition to union
law, some EU Member States have enacted national security breach
notification laws. A non-exhaustive list of these laws is reported in
[20]. Our review indicates that almost all union and national breach
notification laws use fines as an incentive mechanism to ensure
firms’ compliance.
Two complementary legislative proposals intend to expand exist-
ing union breach notification laws in the future:
• Regulation (EU) 2016/679. This regulation is referred to as the
“General Data Protection Regulation” (GDPR), and aims to har-
monize and unify existing EU privacy breach reporting obliga-
tions. It requires “data controllers and processors” in the EU to
report privacy breaches to authorities. (The GDPR will also
apply to firms based outside the EU who process personal data of
Europeans.) The authorities may then inform affected individ-
uals, e.g., when a breach is likely to violate rights and freedoms.
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 entered into force in May 2016, and
repeals the data protection Directive 95/46/EC in May 2018.
• Proposal COM/2013/048 final [21]. The proposed directive is
referred to as the “Network and Information Security Directive”
(NIS Directive). Its declared objective is to establish a high level
of information security in the EU. Selected “market operators”
will have to report breaches to authorities only. (In the context
of the NIS Directive, we use “firms” as shorthand for the legal
term “market operators”) The NIS Directive is expected to enter
into force in the course of 2016.
In the tradition of other union breach notification laws, both the
GDPR and the proposed NIS Directive provide for fines to ensure
firms’ compliance.
Possibilities to enhance compliance
Breach notification laws in the USA and the EU all pose enforcement
challenges as regulators must verify if firms comply. The threat of
fines may incentivize some firms. But others, who expect higher
costs, e.g., because of reported breaches becoming public, will rather
refrain from reporting and speculate that their concealment remains
undetected. Thus, the laws’ objectives may fail without mechanism
verifying compliance.
In order to incentivize firms’ compliance, some form of direct
regulation may be necessary. Winn [22] analyzes US state notifica-
tion laws and argues that these laws are likely ineffective, as they do
not directly regulate how compliance is verified. The EU laws also
suffer from this issue, but national implementations of the NIS
Directive may change the situation. This Directive mentions security
audits that can be used to check whether firms’ reporting obligations
to authorities have been fulfilled. Yet, many practical questions re-
main open. Our working hypothesis is that firms undergo
spontaneous security audits, initiated by regulators. If unreported
breaches are discovered during these audits, sanctions are imposed.
The prospect of sanctions can incentivize firms to report breaches,
which entails indirect costs as authorities may publish corresponding
information. In order to reduce expected sanctions and indirect
costs, firms can increase their investments into security. Thus, direct
regulation may change firms’ incentives.
Incentives of firms
In a situation without breach notification laws, the expected impact
of security breaches establishes incentives for firms to invest in in-
ternal control mechanisms and to share security information with
each other [10]. Cavusoglu et al. [23] distinguish between two cate-
gories of control mechanisms: preventive and detective controls.
Preventive controls, such as firewalls, try to shield information sys-
tems in order to secure them from security beaches. We interpret a
firm’s investment in preventive controls as security investment. But
preventive controls are no panacea. Thus, many firms complement
them with detective controls, trying to detect breaches that already
happened. For instance, firms can make use of intrusion detection
systems (IDS). However, such systems can result in type I errors
(alerts, even though there are no breaches) and type II errors (ab-
sence of alerts, even though there are breaches). In order to reduce
the probability of these errors, and leverage security investments in
general, firms can share security information with each other [24].
This includes information on how to prevent or detect breaches, and
methods to minimize their impact [16]. Platforms for information
sharing are provided by “Security Based Information Sharing
Organizations” (SB/ISOs), e.g., “Computer Emergency Response
Teams” (CERTs) or “Information Sharing Analysis Centers”
(ISACs).
Laws similar to the NIS Directive [21], which has the prospect to
enforce mandatory security breach reporting to authorities by means
of direct regulation, affect these incentives of firms:
• They can incentivize firms to report breaches to authorities even
though reporting entails “disclosure costs,” i.e., expenses emerg-
ing from bureaucratic burdens and indirect costs due to author-
ities’ publication of obtained information. This is because non-
reported breaches may lead to sanctions in the event of audits.
• They can incentivize firms to increase investments in controls.
The reason is that investment in security reduces the number of
breaches at firms, and therefore reporting obligations.
Furthermore, remaining breaches have to get detected before
they can be reported, requiring detective controls.
• They can incentivize firms to abstain from investments in con-
trols. The rationale is that informed authorities’ advise can be
utilized by firms to leverage investments. Thus, optimal security
levels may be reached at lower costs [16].
Overall, the enforcement of laws mandating breach reporting to
authorities may incentivize firms to internalize negative externalities
of their insecurity. Specifically, they can incentivize firms to enhance
their security levels, leading to a reduction of breach probabilities in
the economy. Thus, less breaches propagate and negatively affect
others. However, this internalization of negative externalities may
be accompanied by substantial security investment costs and sanc-
tions at firms.
We are not aware of previous research analyzing the potential
economic benefits and barriers of mandatory security breach report-
ing to authorities enforced by direct regulation. This leads to our re-
search question.
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Research question
The objectives of the NIS Directive [21] motivate our research
question:
Mandatory security breach reporting to authorities (cf. Section
“Security breach notification laws”), enforced with audits and sanc-
tions, may change the incentives of firms to invest in security and
share breach information (cf. Section “Incentives of firms”). Under
what circumstances does this change lead to (i) a higher overall level
of information security, and (ii) lower social costs?
The response to this question is relevant for firms who decide on
security investments and breach reporting. Moreover, it is relevant
for regulators enforcing security breach notification laws by means
of security audits and sanctions.
In this article, we devise and analyze a principal–agent model to
answer our research question. The model includes parameters for
the following properties: interdependence of information security
(cf. Section “Motivation”), an informed authority’s effectiveness in
dissemination of knowledge to firms (cf. Section “Security breach
notification laws”), and disclosure costs (cf. Section “Incentives of
firms”).
Related work
Two streams of theoretical literature are closely related to our work:
papers on the effectiveness of audits in the context of principal–
agent problems (cf. Section “Effectiveness of audits in principal–
agent setups”), and papers on the economics of security information
sharing. The second stream of literature can be further divided in
papers that discuss the economic incentives for
• voluntary information sharing between firms (cf. Section
“Voluntary information sharing between firms”);
• mandatory information sharing between firms and individuals
(cf. Section “Mandatory information sharing between firms and
individuals”);
• mandatory information sharing between firms and authorities
(cf. Section “Mandatory information sharing between firms and
authorities”).
Effectiveness of audits in principal–agent setups
Ng and Stoeckenius [25] were among the first to analyze the effect-
iveness of audits in solving a principal–agent problem. They identify
a moral hazard problem in the reporting of performance from the
management (agent) to the owner (principal) of a firm, and discuss
how audits can incentivize the agent to comply with reporting obli-
gations. Their seminal work from 1979 has triggered a lot of re-
search on principal–agent problems with moral hazard and adverse
selection (e.g., [26, 27]). Much of this research has in common that
audits are contractually agreed upon [28].
In contrast to this literature, we analyze the design of legislation
which includes audits and sanctions to establish incentives for an
agent to comply.
Voluntary information sharing between firms
There is substantial work on voluntary information sharing between
firms. All of the papers discussed in the following assume security
information sharing to be conducted in SB/ISOs. Moreover, most of
the papers use a model with two interdependent firms [5] represent-
ing an economy. Both firms can invest in information security,
decreasing the probability of breaches to their information systems.
To capture security investment decisions of firms, authors usually
base their models on the assumptions of Gordon and Loeb [29].
Gordon et al. [16] evaluate the effects of security investment and
security information sharing on firms’ costs due to security breaches.
They argue that information sharing between firms has a leverage ef-
fect on security investments. Their findings indicate that investment
and sharing can act as strategic substitutes in decreasing breach-
related costs. By contrast, Gal-Or and Ghose [10] analyze the effects
of firms’ investments and security information sharing on customers’
demand for products. According to them, a firm’s publication of se-
curity investment decisions or participation in a sharing arrange-
ment, e.g., an ISAC, both establish confidence with customers that
security efforts are successful. This is interpreted as a positive effect
on the demand of this firm’s products. Additionally, private security
information sharing between firms leverages their security invest-
ments. However, if information that is shared between firms leaks,
this can result in indirect costs. The authors’ results indicate that if
sharing has large positive implications on product demand, firms
naturally share security information. They observe that investment
and information sharing may act as strategic complements. Hausken
[17] proposes a model of information sharing between firms similar
to the authors of [16, 10]. He argues that in the presence of strategic
attackers, firms’ sharing can have positive or negative effects on
their profits—depending on prevailing interdependence. His analysis
reveals that firms’ information sharing increases with their inter-
dependence, and is zero in case of no or negative interdependence.
Liu et al. [24] argue that firms’ logical interdependence plays a key
role for their investment and information sharing decisions. They
find that if firms possess complementary assets, i.e., assets that have
to get combined in order to provide value to an attacker, sharing in-
centives exist. By contrast, if firms possess substitutable assets, they
do not share. Either way, investment decisions are suboptimal in
case that the firms do not coordinate their choices.
The authors of [30, 31] propose models on security information
sharing that differ from those introduced before. Khouzani et al.
[30] analyze two firms’ incentives to invest in the discovery of vul-
nerabilities to their (homogenous) information systems, and to share
vulnerability information. Both firms operate on the same market,
and private knowledge about vulnerabilities has a positive effect on
each firm’s own utility. Though, under the assumption that breaches
result in loss of customers’ confidence and trust in industries, vulner-
ability exploitation at any firm leads to overall market shrinkage.
The authors find that firms are willing to share vulnerability infor-
mation if the loss from market shrinkage exceeds individual gains
from private information on vulnerabilities—and vice versa. In ex-
tension to all previously introduced works, Naghizadeh and Liu [31]
propose a model to analyze incentives for information sharing con-
sidering repeated interactions of two firms. Thereby, each firm’s
sharing improves the other’s payoff, and is associated with disclos-
ure costs. The authors show that if both firms interact only once,
they abstain from sharing even though this could improve their pay-
offs. By contrast, if firms repeatedly interact, they are able to condi-
tion future sharing decisions on past interactions. This can enable
firms to coordinate sharing decisions, and improve their payoffs.
Our model setup in this article is closely related to the above-
cited works.
Mandatory information sharing between firms and
individuals
Considerably less theoretical work addresses mandatory informa-
tion sharing between firms and individuals, although there are
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corresponding breach notification laws in several US states [8].
Romanosky et al. [15] are the first—and to our knowledge only—
ones to analyze this research topic using an economic model. They
argue that breach publication to affected individuals leads to two
types of costs for firms. First, firms have to expect some disclosure
tax, e.g., regulatory fines and indirect costs. Second, firms bear some
losses from individuals. Specifically, they can get held liable for
harm resulting from breaches, e.g., because of individuals’ class ac-
tion lawsuits. The authors’ analysis reveals that even though firms
are affected by both types of costs, mandatory sharing between firms
and individuals can be socially beneficial. This is because it estab-
lishes incentives for firms to increase investments, reducing the prob-
ability of security breaches, and enables individuals to take care.
However, some political instruments may be necessary for regula-
tors to optimally reduce the overall social costs.
Our model in this article does not stand in the tradition of the
work by Romanosky et al. [15] as we do not consider individuals’
actions, though we also respect that firms fear the costs associated
with breach publication. In fact, some firms even try to offset these
costs by the release of positive news simultaneous to a breach publi-
cation [32].
Mandatory information sharing between firms and
authorities
€Ogu¨t et al. [18] are the first to discuss the economics of security in-
formation sharing between firms and authorities. However, they do
not analyze mandatory sharing. The authors primarily investigate
the effects of security interdependence between firms on their incen-
tives to invest in information security and cyber insurance. Their
findings suggest that interdependence reduces firms’ investment in-
centives. This leads to overall suboptimal security levels. Breach in-
formation sharing between firms and an authority may oppose the
effect of security interdependence. The reason is that an informed
authority can draw conclusions from reported breaches, and dissem-
inate knowledge on derived countermeasures. This information may
then be used by firms to lower their breach probabilities. In turn,
this results in a reduction of the number of breach propagations in
an economy, and therefore interdependence. Thus, the authors con-
clude that information sharing between firms and authorities can re-
sult in positive welfare effects.
In previous work [19], we analyze the implications of firms’
mandatory security information sharing with authorities on their in-
vestments in internal controls. The proposed model assumes that in-
formation sharing leverages controls. However, firms do not share
information voluntarily because of associated disclosure costs. Thus,
a regulator considers to enforce sharing by the introduction of an in-
centive mechanism. The analysis reveals that if a weak incentive
mechanism is introduced by the regulator to enforce sharing, this in-
centivizes firms to prioritize investments in preventive rather than
detective controls. In this situation, positive welfare implications are
conceivable due to the sharing’s leverage effect on security invest-
ments. In contrast, a strong incentive mechanism reverses firms’ pri-
orities, and can lead to economy-wide security over-investments.
These over-investments may negatively affect welfare as they are
associated with substantial costs at firms. Though, the analysis does
not provide for parameter settings in which regulators should ab-
stain from enforcement because of these costs.
In what follows, we will devise a principal–agent model that can
be used to evaluate parameter settings where the enforcement of
firms’ security breach reporting to authorities is socially beneficial.
This model is primarily inspired by the theoretical literature on
voluntary information sharing between firms. It comprises two firms
that represent an economy. Both are affected by attacks on their in-
formation systems. A firm’s security investment can reduce the num-
ber of successful attacks, i.e., breaches, according to the
assumptions in [29]. However, the firm’s breach probability is also
affected by the other firm’s investment, because security is inter-
dependent [5]. Consequently, security underinvestment of one firm
leads to negative externalities on the other. In order to reduce nega-
tive externalities, firms can share information on detected security
breaches with each other [18]. But privately shared information may
leak and thus result in disclosure costs, as argued by the authors of
[10]. Therefore, both firms base their sharing decision on a cost–
benefit tradeoff, and it is conceivable that they abstain from sharing
altogether. Regulators can counter a lack of sharing incentives by
enforcing a law mandating firms to report breaches to an authority
[21]. Thereby, a conflict arises that can be interpreted as a
principal–agent problem with moral hazard [28]: the regulator
(principal) cannot be sure that firms (agents) comply with the law.
Thus, he requires security audits to detect and sanction unreported
breaches at agents. However, agents can only comply with reporting
obligations if they detect breaches. And as audits cannot differenti-
ate between nescience and concealment of breaches, it may be diffi-
cult for the principal to decide on the security audit probability and
sanction level enforcing the law.
Model
Our principal–agent model consists of three different components: a
model for security investment and firms’ interdependence, a formal-
ization of mandatory security breach reporting to an authority, and
a formalization of security audits. These components will be
described in Sections “Security investment and interdependence,”
“Detective controls and security breach notification laws,” and
“Disclosure costs and security audits,” respectively. Each compo-
nent includes one of the free parameters specified in Section
“Research question.” We will study the model’s social optima in
Section “Social optima” and its Nash equilibria in Section “Nash
equilibria.” Table A1 summarizes all symbols used.
Security investment and interdependence
Consider for now a single rational firm belonging to a larger econ-
omy. This firm has a choice on investment in information security
x  0, which can decrease the probability P of security breaches to
its information system. We model realizations of the random varia-
ble B (breach) as a2{0,1}, and follow Gordon and Loeb [29] by char-
acterizing the relationship between breach probability and
investment as Pr(a¼1)¼P(x). With an increase in investment x, the
probability of a security breach decreases @P=@x < 0, but at a
decreasing rate @2P=@x2 > 0, i.e., lim x!1 PðxÞ ! 0. According to
Bo¨hme [33], a simple way to capture this relationship in a functional
form is PðxÞ ¼ bx. The parameter b represents the security product-
ivity of the firm, which we subsequently assume to be “moderate”,
i.e., b ¼ 20. Furthermore, we assume that each attack on an unpro-
tected information system x ¼ 0 results in a security breach and
causes direct costs q1. We fix the direct costs of a security breach on
q1 ¼ 1 to normalize the monetary scale. Overall, the firm’s expected
costs due to security issues are given by
cðxÞ ¼ PðxÞ  q1 þ x : (1)
We generalize this model setup to an economy with n¼2
symmetric, a priori homogenous and rational firms. Both firms
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i 2 f0; 1g individually choose their security investment xi.
According to €Ogu¨t et al. [18], who introduce a parameter for secur-
ity interdependence c 2 ½0;1 between two firms, we can express the
security breach probability at firm i as
Piðxi; x1iÞ ¼ 1 ð1 PðxiÞÞ  ð1 c  Pðx1iÞÞ : (2)
The intuition of Equation (2) is that firm i can only evade a
loss if itself does not get breached and no breach propagates
from firm 1 i due to interdependence. Without interdependence,
i.e., c ¼ 0, we find that the security breach probability is
Pr(ai¼1)¼ Piðxi; x1iÞ ¼ PðxiÞ.
Detective controls and security breach notification laws
We acknowledge that both firms have a self-interest in detecting
security breaches and denote the realization of the random variable
D (security breach detected) as a^i 2 f0;1g. The success probability
of detecting a breach is given by Prða^i ¼ 1jai ¼ 1Þ ¼ 1 , where 
is the error rate of detective controls. We assume that, as an exem-
plary detective control, firms use IDS. However, we ignore poten-
tial costs of such systems to restrict the number of parameters in
our model. As a further simplification, we consider that the type I
error rate of IDS is 0%. A study of Lippmann et al. [34] shows
that the best IDS detect about 80% of attacks that have happened.
Thus, we subsequently (optimistically) fix the type II error rate
at  ¼ 20 %.
Once a security breach is detected, breach notification laws re-
quire firms to decide on breach reporting ~ai 2 f0; 1g to an authority.
We indicate a firm’s decision to report the information that no se-
curity breach has been detected as ~ai ¼ 0. Accordingly, ~ai ¼ 1 indi-
cates that a firm reports a detected security breach. Therefore,
compliance with reporting obligations is Prð~ai ¼ 1ja^i ¼ 1Þ ¼ ti. For
the sake of simplicity, we assume that nobody has an interest in re-
porting incidents that did not happen.
If a firm reports security breach information, the authority can
draw conclusions from the breach and advise other firms with the
objective of decreasing social costs. We denote the parameter for
an informed authority’s effectiveness in dissemination of know-
ledge to firms by b 2 ½0;1. According to €Ogu¨t et al. [18], the
positive effect from such dissemination can be interpreted as an
enhancement in firms’ efficiency of security investments or a
reduction of their security interdependence. Note that if all firms
in an economy invest into security, an economy-wide increase in
security productivity reduces breach probabilities, and thus inter-
dependence, ceteris paribus. Subsequently, we assume that an au-
thority’s dissemination of knowledge can reduce interdependence
according to
gðtÞ ¼ 1 b  ð1 Þ  t ; such that (3)
Piðxi;x1i; t1iÞ ¼ 1 ð1 PðxiÞÞ  ð1 c  gðt1iÞ  Pðx1iÞÞ : (4)
The function in Equation (3) is bound to the interval
0  gðtÞ  1. Furthermore, it monotonically decreasing in the ef-
fectiveness of an authority and firms’ compliance, i.e., @g=@b < 0
and @g=@t < 0. According to Equation (4), this reflects the intuition
that information sharing with an effective authority reduces security
interdependence, given that disseminated knowledge is effectively
used by firms.
Furthermore, observe from Equation (4) that truthful reporting ti
of firm i does not contribute to a reduction of its interdependence to
firm 1 i: for n !1, a single firm’s contribution to the reduction
of interdependence is insignificant. Though, truthful reporting
entails disclosure costs.
Disclosure costs and security audits
If regulators pass breach notification laws, firms do not only con-
sider the direct costs of security breaches, but also disclosure costs
associated with breach reporting. Disclosure costs may arise, e.g.,
because of bureaucratic burdens or an authority’s breach publica-
tion. Let q2 2 ½0;1½ denote the parameter for a firm’s disclosure
costs. As truthful reporting ti inevitably leads to these costs, a firm’s
sum of breach related costs are given by
LiðtiÞ ¼ ð1 Þ  ti  q2 þ q1; such that (5)
ciðxi; x1i; ti; t1iÞ ¼ Piðxi; x1i; t1iÞ  LiðtiÞ þ xi : (6)
Disclosure costs lead to a conflict of interest between firms and
regulators, hereinafter interpreted as a principal–agent problem
with moral hazard. A regulator (principal) introduces a security
breach notification law. But firms (agents) may only have few incen-
tives to unilaterally report detected breaches because of disclosure
costs. We assume that agents only report breaches if this does not
make them worse off than concealing them. (Thus, agents which are
indifferent to compliance with the law act law-abiding. In economic
terms, one could consider such agents as “marginal risk averse.”) To
overcome a potentially evolving moral hazard problem where agents
do not comply with the law, the principal can introduce audits and
imposes sanctions for non-reported breaches.
We model realizations of the random variable A (security audit) as
w 2 f0; 1g. The principal abstains from audits if a breach is reported
by an agent, i.e., Prðw ¼ 1j~ai ¼ 1Þ ¼ 0. Otherwise, he conducts secur-
ity audits with probability Prðw ¼ 1j~ai ¼ 0Þ ¼ a. We assume that
every realized audit detects every security breach that has happened
with certainty, i.e., audits are more reliable than detective controls per
definition. For the sake of simplicity, we do not model the costs asso-
ciated with security audits. Rather, we assume that sanctions collected
from noncomplying agents fully compensate these costs.
The decision tree in Fig. 1 summarizes the security breach-
related costs of agent i under such a disclosure regime. The figure
comprises all decisions of both agent and principal. Dashed lines
represent uncertainty because of nature’s decisions. At first, the
agent invests xi in information security. Then, an attack on his in-
formation system takes place. This attack results in a breach with
probability Piðxi; x1i; t1iÞ. We assume that, per period under con-
sideration, there can at most be one security breach to an agent’s
information system. After a security breach has happened, the
agent detects it with probability Prða^i ¼ 1jai ¼ 1Þ ¼ 1 . If the
agent does not detect the breach, he will not report it to the au-
thority. Otherwise, he can strategically choose whether he com-
mits to reporting or not. In cases where the agent does not report a
breach, the principal conducts audits at random. If the principal
detects an unreported breach, the agent is penalized with sanctions
S 2 ½0;1½. Additionally, the agent has to expect disclosure costs q2
as the principal can publish the detected breach.
From Fig. 1, we can derive the expected costs due to security
issues of agent i if mandatory security breach reporting to an author-
ity is enforced, i.e.,
ciðxi; x1i; ti; t1i; aÞ ¼ Piðxi;x1i; t1iÞ  Liðti; aÞ þ xi ; with (7)
Liðti; aÞ ¼ ð1 Þ  ½ti  q2 þ ð1 tiÞ  a  ðq2 þ SÞ
þ   a  ðq2 þ SÞ þ q1 :
Observe from Equation (8) that if the principal introduces infin-
itely high sanctions, and given a positive audit probability, agents al-
ways have incentives to report detected security breaches. Yet,
agents cannot find any breach that has to be reported because of the
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error probability of detective controls. Thus, they will be burdened
with sanctions eventually. In practice, unreasonably high sanctions
are uncollectible, as they lead to agents’ bankruptcy. This renders an
incentive mechanism with infinitely high sanctions infeasible, as also
acknowledged by Khouzani et al. [35]. We are interested in evaluat-
ing practically feasible incentive mechanism, and therefore fix the
sanctions to an assumed to be collectable level S ¼ 1. (Note that this
level is equal to the direct costs of a security breach S ¼ q1 ¼ 1.)
Consequently, the principal’s decision on the audit probability is his
only choice variable.
Social optima
Social costs are defined as the sum of all agents’ expected costs. A
social planner with control over agents’ investments, breach report-
ing, and a principal’s audits, has a minimization problem based on
the agents’ costs in Equation (7), i.e.,
ðx; tÞ ¼ arg min
x;t
2  cðx; x; t; t;0Þ : (9)
Observe from this equation that the social planner does not re-
quire audits. This is because investments and truthful reporting do
not have to get stimulated, but are in control of the planner.
Furthermore, we may substitute xi by x and ti by t because of agents’
symmetry. The solution to the problem in Equation (9), derived in
Appendix 2, consists of extreme and boundary values.
The social planner’s optimal security investment is
xðtÞ ¼ 
log cgðt
Þþ1
4cgðtÞ 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðcgðtÞþ1Þ2
16c2 gðtÞ2  12c logðbÞgðtÞLðt ;0Þ
r 
logðbÞ : (10)
Lemma 1. If b > 0; c > 0; q2 > 0;  > 0 and for any x, a report-
ing strategy 0 < t < 1 is not socially optimal. Under these condi-
tions, the socially optimal reporting strategy is a boundary value,
i.e., tðxÞ 2 f0; 1g.
The proof is in Appendix 2.2.
A social planner will either introduce full reporting of all de-
tected security breaches, or abstain from reporting altogether.
Consequently, optimal security breach reporting is
tðxÞ ¼
(
1 if cðxð0Þ;xð0Þ; 0; 0;0Þ > cðxð1Þ; xð1Þ; 1;1; 0Þ
0 otherwise :
(11)
This case distinction can be interpreted as the implementation of
a security breach notification law under the assumption of fully
complying agents.
Proposition 1. If cðxð0Þ; xð0Þ; 0;0; 0Þ > cðxð1Þ; xð1Þ;1;1; 0Þ,
the social planner introduces breach reporting, and the social opti-
mum is ðt ¼ 1; xð1ÞÞ. Otherwise, the social optimum is
ðt ¼ 0; xð0ÞÞ.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 1 and Equation (11).
Figure 2 illustrates regions for social optima depending on differ-
ent situations in the (c; b; q2)-parameter space. The three lines each
starting in the origin of the coordinate system indicate a social plan-
ner’s indifference in security breach reporting, following from
Equation (11), for three different types of an authority’s effective-
ness b. On and above the lines, the social optimum is ðt ¼ 0; xð0ÞÞ.
In the region below each line, breaches get reported, i.e., the social
optimum is ðt ¼ 1; xð1ÞÞ. Observe that the region below a line is
larger for a more effective authority. This leads to the conclusion
that the introduction of breach reporting to a large extend depends
on an authority’s effectiveness.
Nash equilibria
In practice, there is no social planner and incentives determine the will-
ingness of agents to minimize expected costs due to security issues. A
game-theoretic approach is needed to analyze these incentives. In what
follows, we search for the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the devised
principal–agent game, i.e., the fixed points of the best response of prin-
cipal and agents. According to Macho-Stadler and Pe´rez-Castrillo [36],
Nash equilibria of a principal–agent game with moral hazard can be
derived by the following steps: (i) determination of the Nash equilibria
between agents, disregarding the best response of the principal, and
(ii) backwards induction to determine the principal’s best response.
Agents
If a security breach notification law is implemented, agents simul-
taneously and independently decide on security investments and
breach reporting with the objective to minimize their expected costs
specified in Equation (7), i.e.,
ðxþi ; tþi Þ ¼ arg min xi ;ti ciðxi;x1i; ti; t1i; aÞ ;
s: t: xi  0 :
(12)
Solving the problem in Equation (12) results in the best response
of agent i, given decisions of agent 1 i. Nash equilibria follow
Figure 1. Decisions of agent i, nature, and the principal.
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Figure 2. Social planner’s case distinction in (c; b; q2)-parameter space.
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from the mutual best response of the two symmetric agents. The der-
ivation of these equilibria is proposed in Appendix 3.
Depending on the parameter setting, up to three equilibria can
exist simultaneously. These equilibria imply the security investments
~x1;2ð~t; aÞ ¼ 
log 1
2cgð~tÞ6
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
4c2 gð~tÞ2  1c log ðbÞgð~tÞLð~t;aÞ
q 
log ðbÞ ; (13)
~x3ð~t; aÞ ¼ 0 : (14)
Lemma 2. If the equilibrium implying ~x1ð~t; aÞ exists, then two other
equilibria that contain the investments ~x2;3ð~t; aÞ exist simultaneously,
where ~x3ð~t; aÞ ¼ 0  ~x1ð~t; aÞ  ~x2ð~t; aÞ. Moreover, there are settings
where only the equilibrium with investment ~x2ð~t; aÞ or ~x3ð~t; aÞ ¼ 0
persist.
The proof is in Appendix 3.2.
Three categories of model parameter settings have to be distin-
guished, each resulting in equilibria implying different security in-
vestments. These categories can, for instance, be illustrated based on
security interdependence between agents, ceteris paribus. If inter-
dependence is low, only an equilibrium where agents choose to ex-
tensively invest in security ~x2ð~t; aÞ exists. With moderate security
interdependence, two additional equilibria implying the investment
strategies ~x1;3ð~t; aÞ evolve. If there is high interdependence, only the
equilibrium where agents abstain from any investment ~x3ð~t; aÞ ¼ 0
exists.
Lemma 3. If no disclosure costs are associated with security
breach reporting q2 ¼ 0, only equilibria where agents voluntarily re-
port breaches exist ~t ¼ 1. Otherwise, if q2 > 0, equilibria implying
that agents do not report breaches exist ~t ¼ 0, unless an audit prob-
ability a  amin ¼ q2=ðq2 þ SÞ is introduced.
The proof is in Appendix 3.3.
Nash equilibria imply the security breach reporting strategy
~tð~x; aÞ ¼
1 if a  amin _ q2 ¼ 0
0 otherwise :
(
(15)
Agents’ reporting decision depends on associated disclosure costs
and the introduction of audits by the principal. If there are no dis-
closure costs, agents will always comply with reporting obligations
regardless of audits. This is because in Section “Disclosure costs and
security audits,” we assume that agents act law-abiding in cases
where reporting does not make them worse off than non-reporting.
Otherwise, the principal requires audits and sanctions to incentivize
compliance. For this mechanism to work, the audit probability has
to be adapted to agents’ disclosure costs and the sanction level.
Figure 3 (a) and (b) demonstrate all interesting cases of agents’
best responses to different audit probabilities introduced by the prin-
cipal, assuming disclosure costs q2 > 0. Both figures include the
computed social optimum ðt ¼ 0; xð0ÞÞ as a reference point (indi-
cated byþ).
First we discuss best responses of agents who expect audits
with probability 0  a < amin, depicted by solid and dashed lines
in Fig. 3 (a) and (b). (See the next paragraph for a discussion of
the dotted lines.) This audit probability does not incentivize agents’
reporting to an authority, i.e., compliance. Yet, differences in the
audit probability and interdependence alter evolving equilibria.
Figure 3 (a) depicts a setting with low interdependence c ¼ :3. In
this setting, only one Nash equilibrium ða;0; ~x2ð0; aÞÞ exists
that implies investments increasing in the audit probability, but
which are always below the socially optimal investment. By con-
trast, Fig. 3 (b) depicts a setting with high interdependence c ¼ :8.
Here, if no security audits are conducted a ¼ 0, only the Nash equi-
librium ð0; 0; ~x3ð0; 0ÞÞ where agents do not invest in information
security at all exists. An increase in the audit probability 0 < a
< amin eventually leads to two additional equilibria ða;0; ~x1;2ð0; aÞÞ.
These equilibria imply the security investments x˜1 (0, a) and x˜2 (0, a),
which are decreasing and increasing in the audit probability,
respectively. However, they always stay below the socially optimal
investment.
Figure 3 (a) and (b) also show best responses of agents who ex-
pect audits with probability a  amin by dotted lines. This probabil-
ity incentivizes agents’ compliance. Moreover, differences in the
audit probability and interdependence alter equilibrium strategies.
In a setting with low interdependence, depicted in Fig. 3 (a), agents
have an incentive to introduce very high security investments. Here
only one Nash equilibrium ða;1; ~x2ð1; aÞÞ exists that implies invest-
ments increasing in the audit probability, and exceeding the socially
optimal investment. Consequently, agents over-invest in security,
leading to high social costs. These costs may surpass the benefits
from enforced sharing, which can render mandatory security breach
reporting to an authority as ineffective from a welfare point of view.
In contrast, if there is high security interdependence in an economy,
as depicted in Fig. 3 (b), the introduction of a high audit probability
enforcing agents’ breach reporting can be very effective. This is be-
cause audits may create incentives to invest in security. In the de-
picted scenario, only the Nash equilibrium ða; 1; ~x2ð1; aÞÞ exists. At
this equilibrium, agents’ investments are below the socially optimal
(a) (b)
Figure 3. Best response in security investment and breach reporting of agent i, given decisions of agent 1 i and the principal’s audit probability (a) Best re-
sponse of agent i (c ¼ 0.3); (b) Best response of agent i (c ¼ 0.8). Nash equilibria and social optima are depicted on the angle bisector (Common assumptions:
b ¼ :2;q2 ¼ :2;S ¼ 1, leading to an equilibirum audit probability of amin ¼ :166Þ:
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investment and increase in the audit probability. Thus, a notification
law enforced by the principal can be socially beneficial.
Principal
The principal chooses the audit probability. To decide on this prob-
ability, he observes the maximum security investment ~x2ð~t; aÞ of the
agents as incentive compatibility constraint. The principal does not
have to consider participation constraints, as security breach notifi-
cation laws are legally binding. Thus, his objective is to minimize so-
cial costs according to:
~a ¼ arg min
a
2  cð~x2ð~t; aÞ; ~x2ð~t; aÞ; ~tð~x2; aÞ; ~tð~x2; aÞ; aÞ : (16)
Lemma 4. If the sanction level is positive S > 0, social costs al-
ways increase in the audit probability except for the case where this
probability incites ~t ¼ 1.
The proof is in Appendix 4.1.
Following Lemma 4, a high audit probability has to be
avoided. However, according to Lemma 3, audits may incentivize
security breach reporting. Consequently, the principal introduces
an audit probability which just breaks even to incentivize report-
ing, i.e., amin, and at the same time reduces social costs. This leads
to the case distinction
~a ¼
(
amin if cð~x2ð0;0Þ; ~x2ð0;0Þ;0; 0;0Þ > cð~x2ð1; aminÞ; ~x2ð1; aminÞ;1; 1; aminÞ
0 otherwise :
(17)
Lemma 5. If q2 > 0; S > 0, and ~a ¼ amin, the audit probability at
all equilibria ~a decreases with the sanction level S and increases with
agents’ disclosure costs q2.
The proof is in Appendix 4.2.
The principal can substitute the audit probability and sanction
level to maintain the power of his incentive mechanism. If high dis-
closure costs result in disincentives for agents against reporting
breaches, the principal can counter this issue by raising the expected
sanctions. This can be done by increasing the audit probability or
sanction level, ceteris paribus.
Proposition 2. All equilibria imply an audit probability ~a that
constitutes a threshold value. If audits with the probability ~a ¼ amin
decrease social costs as compared to the situation without audits
~a ¼ 0, the principal chooses the audit probability ~a ¼ amin. Thus,
only the equilibrium ð~a ¼ amin; ~t ¼ 1; ~x2ð1; aminÞÞ exists. Otherwise,
the principal chooses the audit probability ~a ¼ 0, and up the three
equilibria ð~a ¼ 0; ~t; ~x1;2;3ð~t;0ÞÞ may exist simultaneously.
Proof. According to Equation (17), the principal either enforces
reporting with an audit probability ~a ¼ amin or abstains from en-
forcement. If the principal enforces reporting, he uses the incentive
compatibility constrain x ¼ ~x2ð~t; aÞ such that the only existing Nash
equilibrium is ð~a ¼ amin; ~t ¼ 1; ~x2ð1; aminÞÞ. Otherwise, if he abstains
from enforcement, up to three Nash equilibria ð~a ¼ 0; ~t; ~x1;2;3ð~t; 0ÞÞ
may exist. At these equilibria, agents introduce investments analo-
gous to Lemma 2. Furthermore, agents’ willingness to report
breaches is in accordance with Lemma 3.
Figure 4 illustrates regions for the Nash equilibria introduced in
Proposition 2, depending on different situations in the (c; b; q2)-
parameter space. The three lines each starting in the origin of the co-
ordinate system indicate a principal’s indifference in enforcing
breach reporting with audits, following from Equation (17), for
three different types of an authority’s effectiveness b. On and above
the lines, the principal does not introduce audits. This is because
the introduction of audits may only increase social cost, and is thus
detrimental. Consequently, up to three Nash equilibria can exist
simultaneously, i.e., ð~a ¼ 0; ~t ¼ 0; ~x1;2;3ð0;0ÞÞ. In the regions below
the lines, the principal introduces audits which just break even to
incentivize security breach reporting. This decreases social costs,
and only the Nash equilibrium ð~a ¼ amin; ~t ¼ 1; ~x2ð1; aminÞÞ exists.
We conclude that the enforcement of mandatory security breach
reporting to an authority is effective in case of high interdepend-
ence between agents, a high effectiveness of an informed authority
in dissemination of knowledge, and low disclosure costs. If inter-
dependence is high, audits can even stimulate agents’ investments
(cf. the regions below the lines starting from their slope at
c ¼ :749). However, in case that disclosure costs exceed the direct
costs of a security breach q2>q1¼1, enforcement is likely to be
detrimental.
On the abscissa in Fig. 4, we find the special case where agents
always report breaches voluntarily. Therefore, the introduction of
audits to incentivize reporting is useless, and the three Nash equili-
bria ð~a ¼ 0; ~t ¼ 1; ~x1;2;3ð1; 0ÞÞ may exist.
Conclusion
Our principal–agent model covers important characteristics of
the conflict of interest between regulators who enforce security
breach notification laws and firms. However, it cannot fully rep-
resent reality. Nevertheless, we can draw new conclusions from
the analysis of our model with three parameters. We discuss in-
ferences in Section “Discussion”. Finally, we propose possible
model extensions as an outlook for future research and lessons
learned for national implementations of the NIS Directive in
Section “Outlook.”
Discussion
If disclosure costs are not negligible, a security breach notification
law without security audits, regardless of the sanction level, cannot
incentivize firms to report security breaches to authorities. Thus,
authorities are unable to advise other firms by disseminating know-
ledge drawn from reported breaches. In turn, firms cannot use such
knowledge to leverage their security investments. Rather, they make
investments based on their self-interests. These investments are
below the socially optimal level.
min
Figure 4. Principal’s case distinction in (c; b; q2)-parameter space.
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In contrast, a breach notification law with security audits and
sanctions can incentivize firms to report breaches to authorities, re-
gardless of accompanied disclosure costs. With such a law in place,
firms face sanctions for noncompliance with reporting obligations,
and indirect cost associated with information sharing. Therefore,
firms conduct additional security investments to reduce their breach
probabilities, and thus the number of reporting obligations.
Furthermore, authorities can draw conclusions from firms’ reported
breaches and disseminate advice. This advice may help other firms
to leverage their security investments. An overall increase in firms’
security level reduces the negative effects of security interdependence
in the economy. Consequently, the law potentially decreases social
costs as compared to a situation without mandatory breach report-
ing. However, if there is a misadjustment of the audit probability
and sanction level, it can happen that firms over-invest in security.
Thus, the costs associated with the enforcement of the law may ex-
ceed the benefits from established breach reporting.
In order to demonstrate the difficulty in adjusting the audit prob-
ability and sanction level, consider the following scenario: assume
that regulators impose a sanction level equal to the direct costs of
breaches. Consequently, the optimal audit probability to incentivize
breach reporting depends on the disclosure costs of firms. If the dis-
closure costs, direct costs, and the sanction level are all equal, regula-
tors would have to introduce an audit probability of 50% to enforce
mandatory security breach reporting to authorities. Regard the situ-
ation in Germany to examine the practical implications of this scen-
ario. In 2012, the “Statistisches Bundesamt” recorded about 80 000
German firms employing more than 50 people [37]. In the event that
a breach notification law affects all of these firms, about 40 000 se-
curity audits are required—in a period to be defined—to incentivize
their compliance. However, an introduction of more than 40 000
audits, or a considerable increase in the sanction level, ceteris pari-
bus, can lead to security over-investments. A tradeoff between audits
and sanctions may be conceivable in order to enact a politically feas-
ible security breach notification law. Regulators can, e.g., increase
the sanction level to decrease the amount of security audits. But this
harms firms which do not report breaches because they cannot detect
them. Consequently, the enforcement of mandatory security breach
reporting to authorities is not always socially beneficial.
Laws that enforce mandatory security breach reporting to
authorities are most reasonable in case of high security interdepend-
ence between firms, and low disclosure costs. In fact, if disclosure
costs exceed the direct costs associated with breaches, enforcement
will almost always be detrimental. Moreover, we observe that such
laws are only justified under optimistic assumptions on the effective-
ness of informed authorities in drawing conclusions from reported
security breaches, and the dissemination of this knowledge to others.
However, we lack quantifications of the parameter in our model,
and thus require further empirical evidence. Without evidence on
where in the parameter space economies stand, legislative
approaches stipulating breach reporting to authorities should be
called into question.
Outlook
We have presented a simple economic model, in which regulators
introduce security audits and impose sanctions on firms to enforce
mandatory breach reporting to authorities. In particular, the pro-
posed NIS Directive [21] motivates this approach. As a next step,
our results on the adjustments of audit probabilities and sanction
levels which effectively incentive firms’ breach reporting should
undergo a feasibility check.
Furthermore, different extensions of our model are conceivable.
It is possible to interpret effective knowledge dissemination of
authorities as a reduction in the breach probability at firms, rather
than a reduction of interdependence between firms [18]. This could
be modeled via an effect of information sharing on the economy-
wide security productivity. Besides, one could consider over-
reporting of firms, which has been identified in the context of other
notification laws and can harm information quality. Additionally,
the modeling of security audits’ inaccuracy and entailed costs prom-
ises interesting results.
With regard to future models on breach notification laws, it is pos-
sible to incorporate government strategies fostering voluntary compli-
ance and self-regulation of firms [22]. These models may, e. g., regard
political instruments such as subsidies, liabilities, and taxes. One could
utilize the currently discussed US legislation, providing for liability pro-
tection of firms that share information about breaches with authorities,
as a starting point for the construction of such models.
We can also learn some lessons for national implementations of
the NIS Directive. The benefit to society of its implementation
depends on economy-wide interdependence, though we could not
find any empirical quantification of interdependence. Thus, regula-
tors should place this on their research agenda. Additionally, regula-
tors have to be cautious when adjusting the audit probability and
sanctions level to incentivize firms’ breach reporting. Such adjust-
ments must respect disclosure costs associated with reporting, which
may differ between firms of different size and type. Therefore, regu-
lators should not implement a “one-size-fits-all” solution, but have
to adapt different incentive mechanism to groups of “similar” firms.
It remains an open question if the established breakdown by sectors
is the best classification for this purpose.
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Appendix 1: Symbols
Appendix 2: Social planner controls both security
investments and security breach reporting (cf. Section
“Social optima”)
The first derivations of Equation (9), w. r. t. x and t, are:
@c
@x
¼ ½c  gðtÞ  ð1 PðxÞÞ þ ð1 c  gðtÞ  PðxÞÞ  Lðt; 0Þ  @PðxÞ
@x
þ 1 ;
(A.1)
@c
@t
¼ ð1 Þ  PðxÞ  ðð1 PðxÞÞ  ðc  q2  gðtÞ  b  c  LðtÞÞ þ q2Þ :
(A.2)
Appendix 2.1 Optimal security investment
The root of the first-order condition of Equation (9) @c=@x ¼ 0 is:
xðtÞ ¼ 
log cgðt
Þþ1
4cgðtÞ 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðcgðtÞþ1Þ2
16c2 gðtÞ2  12c log ðbÞgðtÞLðt ;0Þ
r 
logðbÞ : (A.3)
This expression corresponds to Equation (10).
Appendix 2.2 Optimal security breach reporting
and Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The second derivation of Equation (9) @2c=@t2 is:
@2c
@t2
¼ 2  b  c  q2  ð1 Þ2  ð1 PðxÞÞ  PðxÞ : (A.4)
Based on Equation (A.4), we observe that, for b > 0; c > 0;
q2 > 0;  > 0 and any x
, @2c=@t2 < 0. Thus, the cost function in
Equation (9) is concave in t, and tðxÞ 2 f0;1g are boundary values.
Appendix 3: Agents control both security investments
and security breach reporting (cf. Section “Nash
equilibria”)
The first derivations of Equation (12), w. r. t. xi and ti, are:
@ci
@xi
¼ ð1 c  gðt1iÞ  Pðx1iÞÞ  Liðti; aÞ  @PðxiÞ
@xi
þ 1 ; (A.5)
@ci
@ti
¼ Piðxi;x1i; t1iÞ  ð1 Þ  ðq2  a  ðq2 þ SÞÞ :
(A.6)
Appendix 3.1 Security investments
The root of the first-order condition of Equation (12) @ci=@xi ¼ 0,
i.e., the best response of agent i, is:
xþi ðx1i; ti; t1i; aÞ ¼ sup 
log 1log ðbÞLðti ;aÞ 1cgðt1iÞbx1ið Þ
 
logðbÞ ; 0
8<
:
9=
;:
(A.7)
The mutual best response ~xð~t; aÞ ¼ xþi ð~x; ~t; ~t; aÞ leads to security
investments at Nash equilibria. Note that because of the constraint
in Equation (12), there also exists a corner case if 0 ¼ xþi ð0; ~t; ~t; aÞ.
Thus, equilibria can imply the security investments:
~x1;2ð~t; aÞ ¼ 
log 1
2cgð~tÞ6
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
4c2 gð~tÞ2  1c log ðbÞgð~tÞLð~t;aÞ
q 
logðbÞ ; (A.8)
~x3ð~t; aÞ ¼ 0 : (A.9)
This corresponds to Equations (13) and (14).
Appendix 3.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The amount of present equilibria depends on the discriminant in
Equation (A.8). If the discriminant is negative, e.g., because
Table A1. List of symbols
Symbol Type Meaning Constraint
x Choice variable Security investment x  0
t Choice variable Probability of truthful reporting t 2 ½0; 1
a Choice variable Audit probability a 2 ½0;1
q2 Parameter Security breach disclosure costs q2  0
c Parameter Security interdependence c 2 ½0; 1
b Parameter Effectiveness of an authority b 2 ½0; 1
n Constant Number of firms n ¼ 2
S Constant Sanction level S ¼ 1
 Constant Error rate of detective controls  ¼ :2
q1 Constant Direct costs of a security breach q1 ¼ 1
b Constant Security productivity b ¼ 20
L Function Sum of security breach related costs
g Function Changes in interdependence
P Function Security breach probability
c Function Expected costs due to security issues
B Random variable Security breach
D Random variable Security breach detection
A Random variable Security audit
a Realization Realization of B a 2 f0; 1g
a^ Realization Realization of D a^ 2 f0; 1g
~a Realization Choice on security breach reporting ~a 2 f0; 1g
w Realization Realization of A w 2 f0; 1g
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c >
logðbÞ  Lð~t; aÞ
4  gðtÞ ; (A.10)
then only one equilibrium implying ~x3ð~t; aÞ ¼ 0 exists. Otherwise,
the two equilibria with investments ~x1;2ð~t; aÞ may exist additionally,
where ~x3ð~t; aÞ  ~x1ð~t; aÞ  ~x2ð~t; aÞ. Based on Equations (A.7) and
(A.8), the three equilibria implying security investments ~x1;2;3ð~t; aÞ
can exist simultaneously under the conditions:

log 1
2cgð~tÞ þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
4c2 gð~tÞ2  1c log ðbÞgð~tÞLð~t;aÞ
q 
log ðbÞ  0; and (A.11)

log 1
log ðbÞLðti ;aÞ 1cgðt1iÞb0ð Þ
 
log ðbÞ  0 : (A.12)
Both conditions are fulfilled iff:
c  log ðbÞ  Lð~t; aÞ  1
log ðbÞ  gð~tÞ  Lð~t; aÞ : (A.13)
Equations (A.10) and (A.13) can also be solved for all other par-
ameter and the audit probability: all parameter and the audit prob-
ability influence the existence of all equilibria.
Based on the previous constraints, we can differentiate between
three categories of model parameter settings that lead to different
equilibria: (i) an equilibrium implying ~x3ð~t; aÞ exist alone iff
Equation (A.10) holds; (ii) the equilibria with security investments
~x1;2;3ð~t; aÞ all exist simultaneously if Equation (A.13) holds, but not
Equation (A.10); (iii) the equilibrium implying ~x2ð~t; aÞ exists alone
iff Equation (A.13) does not hold.
Appendix 3.3 Security breach reporting and
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Based on the first derivation of Equation (12) @ci=@ti, we ob-
serve that:
@ci
@ti
¼ Piðxi; x1i; t1iÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
>0
 ð1 Þ  ðq2  a  ðq2 þ SÞÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
sign depends on a; S and q2
: (A.14)
If a ¼ 0 ^ q2 > 0, an agent does not have incentives to report se-
curity breaches, i.e., @ci=@ti > 0. Consequently, equilibria implying
~tð~x; 0Þ ¼ 0 evolve. Otherwise, if a ¼ 0 ^ q2 ¼ 0, agents are indiffer-
ent to reporting, i.e., @ci=@ti ¼ 0. Based on our assumptions on
agents’ reporting behavior in Section “Disclosure costs and security
audits”, this leads to compliance. If q2 > 0, a principal can
incentivize agents to report breaches with the introduction of
audits a > 0, which may lead to @ci=@ti  0. In order to determine
a principal’s minimum audit probability a ¼ amin that incentivizes
security breach reporting of agents, we use the second part of
Equation (A.14), i.e.,
0 ¼ ð1 Þ  ðq2  amin  ðq2 þ SÞÞ () amin ¼ q2
q2 þ S : (A.15)
A principal can incentivize agents to report breaches with the
introduction of an audit probability a  amin ¼ q2=ðq2 þ SÞ.
Consequently, equilibria implying the reporting strategy ~tð~x; aÞ ¼ 1
evolve if the audit probability is high enough.
Appendix 4: Principal controls audit probability (cf.
Section “Nash equilibria”)
The first derivation of Equation (16), w. r. t. a, is
@c
@a
¼ 2  Piðxi; x1i; t1iÞ  ðð1 tiÞ  ð1 Þ  ðq2 þ SÞ þ   ðq2 þ SÞÞ :
(A.16)
Appendix 4.1 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Based on Equation (A. 16), if the sanction level is positive
S > 0, and except for the case where the audit probability incites
~t ¼ 1, we find that:
@c
@a
> 0 : (A.17)
Appendix 4.2 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. In Appendix 3.3, we derived the audit probability to incentiv-
ize reporting of agents, i.e., amin ¼ q2=ðq2 þ SÞ. The first derivations
of amin, w. r. t. S and q2, are
@amin
@S
¼  q2ðq2 þ SÞ2
; and (A.18)
@amin
@q2
¼ Sðq2 þ SÞ2
: (A.19)
If q2 > 0 and S > 0, we find that @amin=@S < 0 and
@amin=@q2 > 0.
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